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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3736 
___________ 
 
JOURDEAN LORAH, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
HOME HELPER’S INC. DELAWARE RESPITE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-00237) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 17, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 (Opinion filed: December 7, 2011)  
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  Jourdean Lorah appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware’s dismissal of her complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 
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I. 
  In March 2010, Lorah commenced a civil action alleging employment 
discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.  
In her June 22, 2010 amended complaint,
1
 she alleged that her former employer, Home 
Helper’s Inc. Delaware Respite, discriminated against her based on her age, sex, race, and 
national origin.
2
  Lorah was employed by the defendant from May 2007 to June 2009 as a 
care-giver/homemaker.  On April 10, 2009, Lorah was injured at work.  She sought 
medical treatment for her injury but told her manager, Krista Gaul, that she did not need 
therapy or to file a workers’ compensation claim.  Lorah’s amended complaint also 
asserted that she was molested by a patient on May 20, 2009.
3
  She contends that she was 
forced to resign after the molestation because her hours were significantly reduced.  She 
therefore submitted a letter of resignation, stating that she could not continue to work six-
to-eight hours per week and that she could not “withstand the condition[s] of her 
employment concerning sexual harassment and an injury.” 
  Lorah thereafter sought unemployment compensation from the State of 
Delaware.  The Delaware Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denied her claim after 
                                              
1
 The District Court dismissed Lorah’s initial complaint in May 2010 pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915, but gave her an opportunity to amend.  The District Court’s memorandum 
order specified that the amended complaint must set forth more fully her “allegations of 
discrimination” and attach a “right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.” 
 
2
 Lorah is a Caucasian female over the age of 50. 
 
3
 Lorah filed a police complaint regarding the alleged assault in October 2009. 
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finding that she quit her job without good cause.  Lorah appealed from this decision to 
the Delaware Superior Court and the Delaware Supreme Court, both of which affirmed 
the administrative agency’s decision.  See Lorah v. Home Helpers Inc., 21 A.3d 596 (Del. 
2011).   
  Lorah also wrote a letter to the State of Delaware Department of Labor 
(“DOL”) seeking an “administrative remedy,” and apparently requesting legal 
representation.  In a July 16, 2009 letter, the DOL advised her that it was unable to assist 
her but stated that it was authorized to “negotiate a settlement in an open case.”  It noted, 
however, that in her “matters, the employers did not agree to participate in settlement 
discussions.” 
  On September 27, 2011, the District Court granted the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the complaint and declined to give Lorah another opportunity to amend her 
complaint.  The District Court determined that: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over Lorah’s 
claim of injury that occurred while she was employed; (2) Lorah’s claim regarding the 
denial of her unemployment benefits was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (3) 
Lorah failed to exhaust the remedies necessary to raise a Title VII claim.  
  Lorah now appeals.  
II. 
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because this appeal 
presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  3d 
Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.   
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  The District Court’s memorandum opinion is thoughtful and 
comprehensive, and we see no reason to discuss Lorah’s claims in any detail here.  All 
counts in the amended complaint were properly dismissed by the District Court.  The 
District Court appropriately dismissed Lorah’s claims as unexhausted under Title VII,4 as 
she failed to attach a right-to-sue letter to her amended complaint and provided no 
indication that she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 
200 F.3d 73, 93 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The preliminary step of the filing of the EEOC charge 
and the receipt of the right to sue notification are essential parts of the statutory plan, 
designed to correct discrimination through administrative conciliation and persuasion if 
possible, rather than by formal court action.”) (internal citation omitted).5  Additionally, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lorah’s requests to further 
amend her complaint because the proposed amendments were, as the District Court 
noted, “either frivolous or advance[d] a claim that [wa]s legally insufficient on its face.”  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing 
                                              
4
 To the extent, if any, that Lorah was attempting to raise a claim involving a work-
related injury, or to appeal the state-court unemployment litigation to federal court, the 
District Court was correct in refusing to review these claims.  See 19 Del. C. § 2304 
(stating that the Delaware Worker’s Compensation Act is exclusive remedy for work-
related accidental injuries); Great Western Mining & Mineral Co v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 
615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).  
 
5
 We note that although Lorah is proceeding pro se, she should be well-acquainted with 
the requirements for filing a Title VII claim.  See, e.g., Lorah v. Tetra Tech Inc., 541 F. 
Supp. 2d 629 (D. Del. 2008); Lorah v. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, Civ. No. 
06-cv-539-SLR, 2007 WL 2049908 (D. Del. Jul. 16, 2007). 
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standard for determining whether to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend a 
complaint). 
  We will therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 
3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
